

Michael Gehler and Rolf Steininger, eds., *Österreich und die Europäische Integration 1945–1993* (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 1993)

Anton Pelinka, Christian Schaller, and Paul Luif, eds., *Ausweg EG? Innenpolitische Motive einer außen politischen Umorientierung* (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 1994)

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In June 1994, the Austrian public voted overwhelmingly to join the European Union (EU). While membership in Western Europe's economic bloc had long been debated in Austria, it was only recently (1989) that the debate culminated in an Austrian membership application. These two books offer a detailed, nuanced, and compelling look at the history of Austrian–EU relation and at Austria's decision to join the EU.

Gehler and Steininger have put together a first-rate group of historians, political scientists, and economists in an exhaustive study of Austria and European integration. Broad in scope and nearly comprehensive in coverage, the book provides a rich and detailed survey of the role that European integration has played in Austrian politics from 1945 to 1989, just before the Austrian government applied for membership in the EU.

The text is divided into five parts: "Austrian Politics and Integration," "Austria and Its Western Partners," "Political Parties and Integration," "The Pan-European Movement," and "Security, Economy, and Science." In each part, several authors address key themes in the relationship between Austria and European integration generally and between Austria and the EU. The book concludes with a chronology of key events in Austrian political history from 1923 to 1993. While all the essays are quite interesting, I will discuss only those that stand out in this high-quality collection.

Stephen Hamel's essay is particularly interesting. He examines the period between 1961 and 1972 and finds that international factors played a significant role in limiting Austrian initiatives for close association with the EU. Pressure from Moscow (culminating in the crushing of the Prague Spring), the political fallout of the Franco-British conflict over the British membership application, and the souring of

Austro-Italian relations over terrorism in South Tirol all contributed to a go-slow strategy in Vienna. In contrast, Gregor Leitner finds that, in the time just before the tendering of the Austrian membership application, economic arguments outweighed democratic, security, and neutrality arguments.

In the next section, Steininger and Günther Pallaver pick up some of the themes sketched out in the first section. Steininger's essay examines in detail the efforts by the British to keep the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) together, while it negotiated its failed application for European Community membership in the early 1960s. Pallaver examines in greater detail the Austro-Italian relationship and the efforts of both countries to maintain friendly contacts in the midst of the problems in South Tirol.

Gehler, Martin Hehemann, and Lothar Höbelt examine the positions of the major political parties: Austrian Peoples Party (ÖVP); Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPU); and Association of Independent Voters/League of Independents (WDU/VDU) and Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), respectively, as regards integration. Each essay takes up the internal debates in the parties during the 1950s and 1960s. In the next section, Martin Posselt examines the role of the Austrian Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi in the pan-European movement. Coudenhove-Kalergi, one of the relatively early champions of European integration, was largely eclipsed by such political figures as Schumann, Hallstein, and Monnet after 1945. This chapter sheds light on an important and insufficiently studied figure in the pan-European movement. Finally, Günther Bischof takes the focus across the Atlantic, to explore U.S. views of the tightness of Austria's association with the West. While the data are difficult to access, it appears clear that Austria was long seen in the West and in the United States as an unofficial ally.

As this very brief overview suggests, the book covers a lot of ground. This text falls in the category of what in German-speaking countries is called *Zeitgeschichte* and hence lacks the theoretical arguments that are common in most political science books. Regardless, this book is an excellent resource for political scientists interested in Austria and the EU, providing in one volume the background and detail of key events that colored and continue to color Austria's relationship with its new partners in the EU. It is, therefore, a must-read for political scientists studying Austrian–EU relations.

Pelinka, Schaller, and Luif, in contrast, focus upon the political changes leading to the Austrian application for membership and its negotiation. Narrower in scope, the text explores the role of political culture in Austria's decision to tender an application for EU membership. In the introductory chapter, Pelinka argues that the deconcentration of the political system (meaning the collapse in public support for the two major political parties [SPÖ and ÖVP]) the weakening of the social partnership, and the deregulation and privatization of the economy all contributed to Austria's change of opinion regarding EU membership. He argues that Austria was "westernized" from both below and above. Westernization from below includes growing demands for access to European markets, deregulation of the economy, and privatization. This in turn leads to an increase in political competition, encouraging politicians to seek personal gain out of the growing demands from below.

These same politicians were also encouraged by the heads of major social and economic groups (business associations especially and, to a lesser extent, trade unions) to change their views of EU membership. Hence, political competition contributed to the deconcentration of voter support for the existing political parties and the social partnership they created. Pressures from below generated pressures for change among elites—in this case, first and foremost from the relatively free market-minded pro-EU elements of the ÖVP. Contributing to pressures among elites were calls for change from among the heads of the large economic concerns, who feared falling behind the rapidly integrating EU during the mid- and late 1980s.

The sticking point, as both Pelinka and several of the contributors to the Gehler and Steininger volume note, was official Austrian neutrality. Neutrality had been a key element of Austrian foreign policy since the withdrawal of Soviet troops and was formally adopted by the Federal Council in October 1955. Emphasizing the social dimension of Austrian neutrality (the *herrschende Lehre*, as he puts it), Pelinka suggests that a key stumbling block was removed when legal scholars Waldeman Hummer and Michael Schweitzer published in 1987 their reinterpretation of the neutrality clauses of the Austrian constitution. (The report itself was commissioned by a pro-EU business association). With neutrality and EU membership no longer seen as incompatible, the way was clear for Austria to submit its membership application in 1989.

Pelinka notes that this process had unexpected results, at least for politicians. While many benefitted from identifying with the new orthodoxy (Austria could be neutral *and* an EU member), most did not realize that increased economic competition would lead to increased political conflict and hence to the deconcentration of Austrian politics. Additionally, westernization also put pressure on Austria's social system, causing cutbacks and decreasing benefits. These cuts in the Austrian welfare state only accentuated political deconcentration as disgruntled voters either switched parties or failed to vote.

The chapter by Schaller explores the empirical basis of the argument. Schaller begins by asking how EU membership became such an important political issue in the 1980s. After a brief review of background materials, he then examines in detail the public debates over first the ÖVP's initial membership proposal, then the proposal's transformation into government policy, and finally the proposal's solidification in the membership application. At each point, Schaller goes to great ends to recreate the debate both within the parties and government and in the broader public. Schaller also examines in detail the position of major social actors, including the ÖGB. The chapter tries to answer a number of questions concerning how, why, and when the Austrians decided to negotiate EU membership and which actors played the most significant role in this process. Schaller is particularly interested in the extent to which politicians tried to improve their own careers by participating in the debate. He also examines public opinion regarding membership and the public response to the debates among elites. He concludes by examining the implications of this largely elite-driven membership process, particularly the implications for democracy in Austria.

The final chapter expands the argument to other neutral states, especially Sweden. Luif argues that the EU functioned as a *Rettungsanker* for the smaller, neutral states of Europe, especially as inflation and slow growth threatened the economies of Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland. With the end of the Cold War, neutrality was no longer as key an element of their foreign policies, and hence in the context of the economic problems EU membership was attractive—at least to most elites.

I have but two, minor quibbles with this book. First, the authors are explicitly concerned only with the domestic elements of the Austrian decision to negotiate EU membership, and hence their argument re-

mains incomplete. It is not surprising that the Austrian government applied for EU membership only in the summer of 1989; as "New Thinking" had taken firm control over Soviet foreign policy and as the Soviets were demonstrating clear tolerance of reform governments in Hungary and Poland. While the major collapse of Soviet dominance in Central and Eastern Europe would not come until the fall and winter of 1989, it must have been clear to the Soviet-conscious Austrian government that the Soviets were unlikely to oppose Austrian membership. Hence, this argument cannot explain fully the timing of Austria's decision to join the EU. Again, it must be emphasized that it is not the authors' intent to examine the foreign policy dimensions of their case. Yet this suggests at the least an avenue for follow-up work on this question.

Second, while this reader appreciates the effort to place the Austrian decision in a larger context (Luif's chapter), the valuable lessons that such an effort might generate are underexplored. The reason is that the final chapter does not match the first two methodologically. This is not to say that the chapter is weak; rather it matches up poorly to the other chapters. Indeed, Luif takes the argument in a more political-economic, and foreign policy-oriented direction (which addresses in part my first comment), but does not develop in as much detail the domestic debates in other EFTA countries. These are, ultimately, minor weaknesses in an otherwise well-argued and detailed text.

These two books complement each other nicely. Gehler and Steininger's text provides much of the background to the Pelinka, Schaller, and Luif arguments. Pelinka lays out and Schaller demonstrates a relatively novel approach to the literature on expansion of the EU. Much of this literature is overly descriptive and insufficiently analytic. Pelinka et al. propose a model with testable hypotheses that will serve as a guide for further work on the expansion of regional organizations. The significance of this question is seen in regional organizations as diverse as the EU, NAFTA, and the embryonic Pacific Basin association. Both books provide the reader with a detailed view of the Austrian decision to enter and negotiate its membership in the European Union.

German Politics and Society

Christian Joppke, *Mobilizing Against Nuclear Energy: A Comparison of Germany and the United States* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993)

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When environmental and other quality-of-life protest movements became common after the 1960s, social scientists in the United States and Western Europe tended to explain the new movements in ways that reflected the intellectual idiosyncracies of their own countries as much as the differences in the movements' political contexts and implications. In West Germany, France, and Italy, these movements were understood as products of advanced capitalism, growing because the class structure was changing, state intervention into society was increasing, and the party and interest-group systems had become closed to outsiders; the movements' growth implied both a new cleavage between materialist and post-materialist values and new forms of political conflict. In the United States, by contrast, the protest movements were explained as the result of increased external resources available for certain causes, organizational capacities, and the entrepreneurship of competing leaders who mediated between diverse constituencies.

Christian Joppke's *Mobilizing Against Nuclear Energy* uses a comparison of the West German and U.S. movements against nuclear energy to critique these views and to argue that the movements were determined by the overall political process in each country, including political culture, state structures, short-run opportunities, and the strategies of movement actors.

Joppke skillfully contrasts the anti-nuclear energy movements in the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and explains the observed differences in ways that contribute to the broad debates about the causes of social movements. In spite of commonalities in their nuclear industries and in the timing of the conflicts over nuclear energy, the movements developed in very different ways in these two countries. In West Germany, significant parts of the anti-nuclear movement adopted a stance of fundamental opposition to the state and often used violent protests, putting themselves in a strained relationship with the movement's moderate wing. Even moderate movement groups resorted to direct action in 1975, when they occu-