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**Michael Gehler and Rolf Steininger, eds.,**  
***Österreich und die Europäische Integration 1945-1993. Aspekte einer wechselvollen Entwicklung***  
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Later in the 1980s, the causes Austrian-Community relationships in the 1980s. At that point French and Soviet attitudes relaxed a nuclear. But all the time the European Union became wholly

The collective volume by the Institut für Zeitgeschichte of Innsbruck University, marks a first attempt to narrate and analyze from what few documentary sources are available the long story of Austria's attempts to associate itself with the European Community. The central difficulty is that Austrian foreign ministry records remain closed. The two core narrative chapters by Florian Weiss and Stephan Hamel have to make do with such records from economic ministries as have been opened, public state papers, some information from political party papers, as well as newspapers and the like. Other contributors use whatever materials they can get hold of to try to fulfill the editors' laudable aim to make the volume as comprehensive as possible. On the whole, the volume is a success and does provide a compendium of what is known of the complex relationship between Austria and the Community. There is nothing here from the newly opened State Department files relating to the proposed expansion of the Community in 1961-3, but the chapters were probably written too early for that. Nor is there anything new from Soviet archives. Nevertheless, this is a useful interim report which will not be replaced for some time.

The immediate relevance of the work to current research is the light it throws on the assumption that extension of the Community, or association with it, depended after 1961 on the United Kingdom's success in winning membership. Austria's negotiations for

association, which would have been almost full membership, took little account of de Gaulle's veto against the United Kingdom in 1963. Even more striking is that these negotiations were pursued in spite of repeated unambiguous Soviet assertions that a treaty of association would be regarded, in the words of the memorandum of 30 September 1964, as "a turning-point in Austria's announced policy of permanent neutrality" and, perhaps even more serious in Russian eyes, "a de facto implementation of the economic union with the German Federal Republic forbidden by the State Treaty."

Had the United States been more positive in its support for Austrian links with the EEC, this reaction might be more easily explained. Günter Bischof gives an accurate account of American attitudes, but to this should be added what can now be gathered from the release of the State Department files on the British application. It was the view of the Kennedy Administration that, commercially, neutrals should fend for themselves because they were free riders on the Western alliance. No matter how strong Washington's sympathy for its "secret ally," it could not be seen to be doing more in the negotiations for Austria than it was prepared to do for the other neutrals. Furthermore, the Americans wanted to limit the Community to countries for which political union was the goal, and for Austria it could not be. Behind these immediate problems in Washington lay anxieties about what Austria's "permanent neutrality" really meant.

The explicit Soviet comparison was with Switzerland, and so was that made by those Austrian politicians who were themselves uneasy about the approach to the Community. Of the other neutrals, only Ireland was prepared to contemplate full membership. Yet in the 1960s Austria was in the extraordinary situation that 46 to 50 percent of its exports by value went to a market which discriminated against it, and this was the driving force behind the search for "association." Austria was prepared to make large economic concessions for an arrangement that would be acceptable to the Community and might not in the end prove unacceptable to Moscow.

In July 1960 Austria offered to harmonize its tariff with the common external tariff of the EEC and to apply identical commercial rules to goods coming from third countries. With the collapse of Britain's negotiations, something both more and less than this move was needed; by summer 1966 it had been agreed to recommend to the EEC Ministerial Council that Austria should enter into a complete

customs union for trade in manufactures while there should be preferences for trade in agricultural products. By the end of 1966, a four-year timetable for the implementation of this program had been accepted by the European Commission. On the day the EEC Ministerial Council first considered this, the Six-Day War broke out. Three weeks later, four Italian soldiers were blown up by South Tyrolean terrorists. The negotiations died. We have no available record of whether they could have succeeded. As several contributors point out, de Gaulle was opposed to Austrian association on these terms. Like the Soviets, he thought association was a step towards German unification. But of the attitude of the other member-states we are, in detail, still ignorant.

Later in the volume Gregor Leitner discusses Austrian-Community relationships in the 1980s. At what point French and Soviet attitudes relaxed is unclear. But after the collapse of the DDR, Austrian membership in the European Union became wholly subordinate to the issue of Germany's unification. With the whole of Germany in the European Union, Austria's accession, ironically, is now a guarantee to Russia and France that Austria remains a separate state.

Of the other contributors, Fritz Breuss provides a useful overview based on integration theory of the economic relationships between Austria and the Community, although as always, such analyses cannot capture the allegedly dynamic effects of reducing barriers to trade between the two areas. Michael Gehler traces the evolution of thinking about European integration before 1960 in the *Österreichische Volkspartei*. Rolf Steininger analyzes the moment of decision-making in London when the United Kingdom concluded that EFTA would not serve its purpose of so limiting the EEC as to persuade Germany to abandon it for a wider set of commercial arrangements. Thomas Angerer uses French foreign ministry papers to say something about France's attitude to Austria in the 1950s. France's constant concern was to multilateralise the Austrian question. As the Austrian economy in the 1950s came increasingly under German influence, the commercial separation between the two countries which the Treaty of Rome marked was evidently far from unwelcome in Paris, but France did not wish to appear the sole state to forbid Austrian membership in the EEC. Neither did it wish so to alienate Austria that Vienna should conduct its business with Brussels

solely through Bonn. This may suggest that when French foreign ministry papers for the 1960s are opened, French policy will appear more ambivalent than it does by merely interpreting de Gaulle's rather brutal statements.

The first British application will come to be seen as a very divisive event for the other EFTA member-states. Henceforward, discrimination in international trade would be the accepted rule, and for the smaller west European states outside the EEC responses would vary widely. There is much left to discover, but this useful volume points the way to a wider history of European integration than the current literature, dominated as it is by French, German and British points of view. Sweden and Switzerland, unhelpfully for Austrian governments in the 1960s, regarded the EEC as a non-neutral, commercially undesirable organization. Norway was prepared to consider joining on terms which were unacceptable not merely to the Six, but which even the British government could not support. Denmark was ready to join, but only if the British market came with it. Ireland was ready to join to escape from the British market. Portugal's response was to unite its empire in the Portuguese Single Market. Thus fragmented by the British, EFTA was of little comfort or stability to Austria. Nor was it evident that if things changed in the EEC and Britain did join, anybody in London or Brussels would care about Austria's problems any more than they had in 1961-3.

Austria's version of "*sauve qui peut*" was the equally divisive negotiations of the 1960s, which delayed a clear definition of neutrality and left investors and exporters in a state of prolonged uncertainty caused by the effect of the failure of the negotiations for association on the Austrian economy. This book should surely be eagerly read in Oslo. Alternatively, the editors might consider asking the same team to write a book of the same format in ten years time. Not only would we then have a better test of how much membership of the Community/Union did actually matter, but most of the speculation opened by this study could probably be ended by the release of archival materials.

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